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Accrual of §1983 Claims After Wallace v. City of Chicago
On March 8, 2006, the Seventh Circuit decided Wallace v. City of Chicago.1 In doing so,
the Appeals Court overturned earlier precedent,2 impermissibly interfered with a plaintiff’s
ability to recover under 42 USC § 19833, and reached a shockingly irrational result. My Law
Review Comment will examine the legal underpinnings of the opinion, consider the policy
arguments on both sides, and make suggestions for how the United States Supreme Court should
rule on the issue when it comes before them in the near future.4
The Case:
From the age of 15 until he was 23, Andre Wallace served time in Illinois prison for his
alleged participation in a murder on Chicago’s West side. Wallace was arrested in 1994, gave a
suspect confession, and was subsequently convicted of murder. In 1998, the Illinois Appellate
Court found that the Chicago police arrested Wallace without probable cause and granted him a
new trial. The prosecution dropped the case against Wallace in 2002 and he was released.5
In 2003, Wallace sued the city of Chicago under the Federal Civil Rights Statute, 42
U.S.C. § 1983 in Federal Court, for violating his Fourth Amendment rights. Specifically,
Wallace sued under the state-law tort of “false arrest.” The city moved for summary judgment,
asserting that the suit was barred by a two year statute of limitations mandated by Illinois state
law. The district court granted Chicago’s motion for summary judgment. On appeal, the Seventh
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Circuit affirmed, holding that the statute of limitations started running at the time of the false
arrest.
Why the Heck is this important?
In holding that claims for false arrest accrue for statute of limitations purposes at the time
of the arrest, the Court of Appeals put potential plaintiffs in an impossible bind. The Heck
Doctrine, set forth in Heck v. Humphrey, prohibits claims under § 1983 premised upon the
invalidity of a conviction.6 This doctrine was intended to prevent convicts from using § 1983 to
“collaterally attack” the fact or duration of their sentences. A defendant may not bring any claims
premised on an “allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment” or bring claims that if
successful would render a sentence invalid, unless his conviction has been reversed, expunged,
or otherwise declared invalid.7 Heck reaffirmed that a habeas petition is the “exclusive remedy
for a state prisoner who challenges the fact or duration of his confinement and seeks…release,
even though such a claim may come within the literal terms of § 1983.” 8
Therefore, the friction between the Heck Doctrine and Wallace produces an impossible
situation for a potential litigant hoping to sue under § 1983 for false arrest. Take for example a
hypothetical man arrested and convicted of a murder he did not commit. Wallace holds that the
man must file his § 1983 claim for false arrest within two years of the arrest. Heck holds that he
may not file his § 1983 claim for false arrest until he has been pardoned or his conviction has
been reversed, expunged, or otherwise declared invalid. Since the habeas process, state appeals
process, and even the executive-pardon process takes many years—even decades, the Wallace
case effectively strips potential litigants of a cause of action. If our hypothetical convict wants to
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collect damages from his false arrest under §1983, he must file his suit within two years, which
he obviously cannot do.
Outline
Section I: Summarizing the Problem
First, I will summarize the facts and the holding of Wallace. I will also summarize the
law under § 1983, and the cases that make up the Heck Doctrine. I will then explain how Heck
and Wallace intersect, creating the aforementioned problem for potential litigants.
Section II: Why did the Seventh Circuit Do What it Did?
In this section, I will analyze the Wallace decision and point out the holes in its
reasoning. The Seventh Circuit foresaw the problems that its opinion would cause, and I will
here examine why the solutions offered by the opinion were inadequate.
Section III: How Should the Supreme Court Rule?
In this section, I will introduce my solution to the problem: The statute of limitations
under for false arrest claims should not begin to run until the substantive issues facing the litigant
are resolved. Here, I will discuss policy arguments on both sides, including arguments about the
substantive fairness of both outcomes. I will also try to interpret the legislative intent behind both
§ 1983 and relevant state statutes of limitations. I may choose to bolster my argument with
statistics about the average time it takes to pursue a habeas petition or a course of state-court
appeals.
Generally, I will attempt to do the Supreme Court’s work for them, and decide how the
Wallace case should come out in the Supreme Court.
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